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Introduction
Since the early 1990s in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe, there has been an exponential growth in the number of partnerships at regional, district and local levels, not least because of the profusion of government initiatives in delivering regeneration strategies. One of the main reasons for the growth in the number of partnerships has been the ad hoc and piecemeal approaches adopted by both central and local government in devising new mechanisms for policy delivery. As part of a broader aim to target resources on the most deprived sections of the population, to develop a more strategic approach to policy delivery and to 'rationalise' the number of partnerships, central government has devised a new form of macro-partnership called Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and has provided additional resources to support them.
LSPs operate at the local authority district or borough or county levels and are designed to focus on areas demonstrating high levels of deprivation based on the analysis of deprivation indices for England, published as the Indices of Local Deprivation (DETR 2000) .
Since LSPs are still in their formative stages it is too early to fully evaluate their performance or impact on regeneration policy. However, it is possible to explore this new initiative in the light of theoretical literature on urban governance, community involvement and leadership in inter-organisational networks. It is also possible to identify the main challenges facing LSPs as new and more complex organisational arrangements between the public, private and community-based sectors.
The argument being advanced here is that the establishment of LSPs represents a new and more advanced stage in the development of urban policy in England. They aim to provide a more strategic approach than the previous decade (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) where partnerships were set up often in very localised areas under a series of piecemeal and unfocused policy initiatives. These so called area based initiatives (ABIs) have proliferated to the point where new policy initiatives from all government departments with an area focus need to be approved by the Regional Co-ordination Unit. A recent report (RCU 2002) has reviewed all ABIs and made recommendations about merging and discontinuing a number of sets of partnership bodies.
It is suggested that LSPs have all the characteristics of inter-organisational networks where three core objectives are addressed. First, key stakeholders are being engaged in devising and implementing a strategic approach to regeneration at the local 5 authority level. Second, it can be argued that LSPs represent a further development towards devolving decision-making away from central government with greater emphasis placed on promoting local leadership structures. Third, LSPs are required to work to an integrated and locally agreed community strategy, which includes targeting areas of deprivation and rationalising single-policy partnerships. However, a number of uncertainties remain about the institutional capacity of the system to develop a coherent strategy, engage leaders with the capacity to deliver it, target areas of greatest deprivation, and integrate both mainstream funding agencies and existing area-based initiatives. Further evidence from a Select Committee of the British House of Commons suggests that the performance of LSPs has so far been uneven and that considerable uncertainty remains about accountability, the scrutiny process and their role in relation to local and sub-regional partnerships (House of Commons 2003: 26) . This paper is divided into four sections. The first part reviews the theoretical literature on urban governance, community involvement and leadership. The second part explores the origins and context in which LSPs operate and sets out the objectives, funding and accreditation procedures drawn from the policy guidance provided by government. The third section examines some examples of different approaches to setting up LSPs and highlights some of the challenges they face in doing so. The paper concludes by drawing on the theoretical context, policy guidance literature and examples to suggest the key challenges facing LSPs in the future.
Theoretical Considerations

Urban Governance
Much has been written about the shift in the British state over the last forty years from a system of hierarchical government to one of governance (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997 ). There has been a rapid increase in relatively unaccountable state agencies delivering services at central and local levels and there are proponents of the 'hollowing out of the state' thesis (Rhodes 1994: 138-9) . In the modern western state policy-making used to be the preserve of traditional hierarchies but now this process occurs through the interaction of 'stakeholders'. As Kooiman observes:
These interactions are…based on the recognition of (inter) dependencies. No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular government model. (Kooiman 1993: 4) Rhodes argues that, as a result of complex changes in systems of government after 1979 in Britain, 'central government is no longer supreme' and that 'there is no longer a single sovereign authority'. 'In its place there is this: the multiplicity of actors specific to each policy area; interdependence among these social-politicaladministrative actors; shared goals; blurred boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors; and multiplying and new forms of action, intervention and control.
Governance is the result of interactive social-political forms of governing' (Rhodes 1997: 51) .
In the context of developments in British government, Rhodes suggests that 'governance refers to self-organising, inter-organisational networks' (Rhodes 1997: 53 3. Game-like interactions rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants; 4. A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organising. Although the state does not occupy a sovereign position, it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks.' (Rhodes 1997: 53) There has also been a considerable amount of research on policy networks carried out in the Netherlands (see for example Kickert et al. (eds.) 1997) . Kickert and Koppenjan, for example, note that policy networks are often criticised for being 'nontransparent, inpenetrable structures of interest representation which block essential, broad-based policy innovations and constitute a threat to the effectiveness, efficiency and democratic legitimacy of government performance' (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 59) . They argue that:
'Often, however, there are more positive reasons for joining a network or adopting network management strategies. Networks frequently offer the prospects of results which could not be obtained by government's go-it-alone strategies. Negotiating government and network management are forms of steering in which the public sector is highly dependent on other actors and where the alternatives, market and hierarchy, encounter normative or practical difficulties. ' (ibid, p.59) This discussion of governance through policy networks has many of the hallmarks of the system represented by LSPs. They are collaborative arrangements between different agencies and sectors which can only achieve their objectives through gamelike interactions between network members. They are relatively autonomous from the state and are specifically charged with developing a strategic approach to meeting locally defined needs. Perhaps Rhodes underplays the extent to which central government defines the 'rules of the game' by setting targets, requiring the preparation of strategies and delivery plans, and by ensuring that LSPs only become eligible for additional resources if their membership and other criteria are met through a process of accreditation. In other words, they are a top-down intervention aimed to achieve local network formation. This paradox may help explain why some LSPs have found it difficult to achieve a lasting impact at the local level.
In the British context, and in England in particular, the trend towards urban governance at the local level can be seen in historical terms at least in part as a response to the dramatic upheaval in policy brought about by the Thatcher Government after 1979 (Stoker 2000 . The removal of both powers and finance from local government reinforced a highly centralised state that, in the early stages, stifled local leadership through the imposition of government-appointed agencies, such as the Urban Development Corporations (Raco 2002) . Into the vacuum then evident at the local level were drawn some of the early experiments in public-private partnership (Bailey et al. 1995) . These were at first tolerated because of the involvement of the private sector, and then encouraged by the more corporatist Conservative Government after 1990. The City Challenge programme was perhaps the first example of this (ibid: 64). For the next decade almost every funding regime required the involvement of partnerships for the delivery of regeneration programmes. As a consequence, since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing tension in central government between the desire to target resources on the areas of greatest need to achieve maximum impact and the wider objective of developing an integrated, joined-up and strategic approach to regeneration (RCU 2002) 
Community involvement
The growing importance of urban governance has been linked closely with a more structured approach to community involvement. Much effort has gone into identifying and encouraging the full representation of communities of 'place' and 'interest'.
Many justifications have been put forward for increasing and sustaining community engagement in regeneration (Taylor 2000) . This has in turn led to an extended debate about community networks and social capital and the creation of political opportunity structures (Stoker 2000) to increase the network capacity for engagement. These arguments cannot be rehearsed in full here but capacity building for community groups has been funded through regeneration programmes for some years. This emphasis on capacity building has been inverted so that many now argue that public sector employees and local politicians need 'capacity building' as much as community representatives, since many lack the skills of facilitation and the ability to work in partnership (Taylor 2000 (Taylor : 1026 . Identifying what constitutes effective leadership is itself a difficult issue. In situations where agencies from different sectors are brought together to 'join-up' policy delivery there may well be few signposts towards goals, objectives and processes, and no predetermined lead agency or individual. As Huxham and Vangen point out, collaborative inertia can be the outcome in contrast to the preferred (and often assumed) outcome of collaborative advantage (Huxham & Vangen 2000 : 1160 . In their view, leadership can be ascribed to both individuals as well as occurring 'through collaborative structures and processes' (ibid. p.1160).
Huxham and Vangen identify three 'media' which influence the practice of leadership -structure, process and participants. These factors are often integral to a particular collaborative arrangement and become taken for granted, but can have a considerable influence on the way leadership is exercised.
Leadership through structure is important to inter-organisational working because it has a strong influence on the interactions between member groups. A relatively loose structure where meetings are open to those who wish to attend allows wide access to the agenda. Representatives from different sectors may also bring different cultural assumptions about how business should be transacted and may have different levels of commitment to attending and participating. In contrast, 'a tightly controlled membership structure with, for example, a designated lead organisation, a small, welldefined number of core member organisations, an executive committee, and a set of working groups that report to the committee, may be more able to gain agreement and to implement its agenda, but it may exclude stakeholders from accessing the agenda' (ibid. p.1166). In many cases, such as with LSPs, some guidance is externally imposed by government, although a considerable degree of discretion remains at the local level. In reviewing the role of community leaders in local regeneration partnerships, Purdue (2001) found that leaders emerging from local communities needed to develop mutual trust with both community groups and networks and with a variety of public and private sector stakeholders. Fragmentation and a lack of trust in government initiatives 'made it hard to gain the trust of a wide range of local residents' (ibid. p.2221). On the other hand, 'all too often they were expected to trust their powerful partners without reciprocation' (ibid. p.2222). In consequence, the role of the community leader can be extremely stressful in that by being nominated or elected to a management board they can become divorced from the wider residential constituency, while also very often having only limited power and influence at the decision-making table. This issue of differential stakeholder power has rarely been addressed in government guidance on partnership working.
National Policy Guidance on LSPs
The idea that regeneration policy needed to be delivered strategically at the local level • Bring together at a local level the different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that different initiatives, programmes and services support each other and work together;
• Be a non-statutory, non-executive organisation;
• Operate at a level which enables strategic decisions to be taken and is close enough to individual neighbourhoods to allow actions to be determined at the community level; In order to achieve accreditation from the Government Office, LSPs had to carry out a self-assessment of their progress towards six criteria:
i. Strategic
They are effective, representative, and capable of playing a key strategic role;
ii. Inclusive
They actively involve all the key players, including the public, private, community and voluntary sectors; at the strategic level; more widely; with community and voluntary sectors; with black and ethnic minority communities; with the private sector;
iii. Action-focused They have established genuine common priorities and targets, and agreed actions and milestones leading to demonstrable improvements against measurable baselines;
iv. Performance managed
Members (organisations) have aligned their performance management systems, aims and objectives, criteria and process to the aims and objectives of the LSP;
v. Efficient
They reduce, not add to, the bureaucratic burden;
vi. Learning and developmental
They build on best practice from successful partnerships by drawing on experiences of local and regional structures, and national agencies. (NRU 2001).
Local authorities were given the task of deciding which stakeholders should be represented and in arranging meetings. The guidance made it clear that 'The membership, structure and size of an LSP should reflect both its aims and the breadth of issues that fall within its scope. The precise membership of any partnership will depend on local circumstances and priorities; but LSPs will only be effective if their core membership includes the public, private, community and voluntary sectors' (DTLR 2001: 12) . If LSPs are to be representative, the total membership will be large. The following section briefly reviews progress in two examples drawn from different regions of the UK and with contrasting economic and social conditions. The first example is the City of Gloucester in the South West region, which does not receive any NRF funding. The second is the City of Manchester, the second largest city in the North West region. Space will only allow a brief review of the progress made in these two cases, as well as a discussion of some of the issues they face in the future.
The Social Exclusion Unit lists in its guidance
The Gloucester Partnership
Gloucester is a relatively prosperous and expanding town in South West England with a population of 110,000. Deprivation levels are relatively low and it is not in receipt of an allocation from the NRF, although it has two wards in the ten percent most deprived wards nationally. The City Council works closely with the County of Gloucestershire, which has responsibility for strategic services such as highways and education. The County Council has also established a LSP to cover the whole county so that for the citizens of Gloucester there is a two-tier arrangement of LSPs. Ward, and a social priority: young people. In both cases there are good prospects that additional funding can be secured from the regional development agency and central government.
The Partnership is severely limited as far as resources are concerned because it is not eligible for NRF funding. The City Council provides the secretariat function for partnership meetings (LGA 2002: 10) and an additional £25,000 has been raised for one year to cover incidental expenses and the organization of conferences. This means that the Partnership's primary function is to provide a forum for local stakeholders.
Anything more than this is severely limited by resource constraints.
The Gloucester Partnership has faced real difficulties in establishing workable collaborative arrangements but now feels that the Executive has settled down and is working effectively together. While providing a forum for a variety of stakeholders, it is open to the accusation of being a 'talking shop' because of the very limited resources it has at its disposal. Without NRF, or other sources of central government funding, its effectiveness is substantially curtailed. In addition, there are issues of accountability to be resolved in terms of the relationship of the partnership with the City Council as well as the extent to which members of the LSP are able to represent and take responsibility for the actions of their member organizations. A further set of issues relate to devolution. As noted above, the Gloucester Partnership must also work closely with the larger LSP covering the County of Gloucestershire and there are also the problems all LSPs face in creating their own policy space and exerting influence without duplicating or undermining the activities of the City Council.
Manchester Local Strategic Partnership
Manchester is the second largest urban centre in the North West region of England and in 2001 had a population of 393,000. The inner core has substantial concentrations of deprivation and is a major focus for regeneration activity. The Manchester LSP was set up by the City Council in January 2002 as a new organization by the City Council, after extensive publicity and community consultation in the city. The LSP has a multi-layered structure:
• An all-inclusive Manchester Conference;
• A steering group, which sets the strategic development and is the main decisionmaking body for the partnership;
• A support and delivery group, which seeks to engage key public agencies in a commitment to work together in support of the strategic direction set by the Manchester Community Strategy and LSP steering group;
• Thematic partnerships/working groups and area-based partnerships, which deliver the priorities of the community strategy and LSP steering group. These will address: economic competitiveness and local employment; children and young people; housing; crime and disorder; health; transport; culture.
The steering group sets the strategic direction for the partnership and has a membership of 41, 11 of whom come from the voluntary and community sectors.
There are also five elected members of the Council and representatives of the private sector. The leader of the council was elected chair of the steering group for the first year and the council also provides secretariat services and paid for community consultation. The steering group has set up a series of thematic working groups based on policy areas in Manchester's community strategy. These are: economic competitiveness and local employment; children and young people; housing; crime and disorder; health; transport; and culture.
A Community Network has been set up to improve communications between members of the voluntary and community sectors in the city. It is intended to be both comprehensive and strategic and is divided into seven geographical networks and 22 'communities of interest'. It is developing a representative core group, the Community Network Strategy Group, which will feed into the deliberations of the LSP.
Initially, misunderstanding was caused by the failure of the local authority to involve the community in early deliberations about the formation of the LSP. The sector first became involved at the 'consultation stage' when plans were already well advanced.
It also held its own consultation event and submitted a report on the LSP proposals, containing a series of 12 recommendations. Each of these recommendations has been addressed and some significant changes have been made to the LSP process as a result. These include:
• The right of the Community Network to select its own 8 LSP steering group participants from a pool of 15 who can attend meetings;
• The provision for a community and resident engagement strategy for all aspects of the LSP;
• A more integrated approach to the learning and development programme for the LSP;
• A more explicit focus on tackling poverty and social exclusion;
• A commitment to a full consultation process concerning plans for a Manchester Regeneration Fund. (LGA 2002: 42) As in other locations, the LSP has taken longer than expected to establish itself and to resolve disagreements over the structure and membership of the LSP. It has provided an opportunity to formalize relationships between the voluntary and community sectors and other public and private agencies. It has also provided an opportunity to develop a strategic approach across the community and voluntary sectors. However, major disagreements have arisen over demands for equal representation between this and the public sector. At present about a quarter are from the voluntary/community sectors.
Conclusions
Over the past decade, British urban policy has been charactersised by the development of partnerships for both bidding for funding and delivering regeneration strategies. Partnerships, or in Rhodes' more appropriate description, 'self-organising, inter-organisational networks' (Rhodes 1997 (Rhodes 1997; Kooiman 1993; have highlighted the increasing trend towards inter-organisational or policy networks in almost all aspects of government.
In the field of urban policy, successive initiatives have fluctuated between launching new, and often short-term, pilot projects to be followed soon after by administrative reforms which merge initiatives and combine budgets in order to 'join-up' policy strands and reduce bureaucratic complexity. In addition, there has been a tension between the desire on the part of central government to formulate rules of engagement and provide direction from the centre, and the equal but opposite pressures to devolve decision-making and encourage regional and local leadership. The development of LSPs also raises many issues of accountability and control. It has been noted earlier in discussing the policy network literature that significant criticisms have been voiced about the lack of transparency and accountability. A major challenge for LSPs is to devise effective systems of representation, accountability and reporting back so that recipients and other local interest groups feel they have some influence over the internal working of the LSP.
Inclusivity of community interests is important but a total membership of 41, as noted in the case of Manchester, may be too large for effective decision-making. It appears in the nature of such networks that they may be technically representative of different stakeholders but have no formal mechanism for being accountable for their actions, except very indirectly through funding bodies and the accreditation process.
A further issue hardly addressed by the policy guidance and where there is also little discussion in the theoretical literature is the requirement for LSPs to operate effectively as strategic bodies at the local level. In general, partnership agencies are often better at developing consensual approaches to policy making where significant conflicts between stakeholders are glossed over or airbrushed out of policy documents. To be effective, LSPs will need to operate strategically and develop in Huxham & Vangen's (2000) words, collaborative advantage. The danger is that LSPs are unable to develop an effective strategy and become just another channel for disbursing Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and related funding in parallel to the local authority and localised partnerships. This would be an example of implied and fragmented leadership (Hambleton et al. 2001) .
It is too early to draw final conclusions about whether the development of LSPs represents a more advanced phase of urban policy, whereby the previous ad hoc area- 
